Securing Designs against Scan-Based Side-Channel Attacks

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Abstract—Traditionally, the only standard method of testing that has consistently provided high fault coverage has been scan test due to the high controllability and high observability this technique provides. The scan chains used in scan test not only allow test engineers to control and observe a chip, but these properties also allow the scan architecture to be used as a means to breach chip security. In this paper, we propose a technique, called Lock & Key, to neutralize the potential for scan-based side-channel attacks. It is very difficult to implement an all inclusive security strategy, but by knowing the attacker, a suitable strategy can be devised. The Lock & Key technique provides a flexible security strategy to modern designs without significant changes to scan test practices. Using this technique, the scan chains are divided into smaller subchains. With the inclusion of a test security controller, access to subchains are randomized when being accessed by an unauthorized user. Random access reduces repeatability and predictability making reverse engineering more difficult. Without proper authorization, an attacker would need to unveil several layers of security before gaining proper access to the scan chain in order to exploit it. The proposed Lock & Key technique is design independent while maintaining a relatively low area overhead.

Index Terms-Lock & key, scan design, security, hacking, side-channel attacks.

1 INTRODUCTION

MODERN day VLSI designs are placing an ever increasing number of transistors on a single die. The increasing design size translates to a higher probability of a fault existing on the die after fabrication. In order to detect these faults, test engineers must find a fast and reliable method of testing these large designs before the chips can be passed on to consumers [1], [2]. If the product does not ship soon enough, competition may have a comparable product to offer first, but if testing is not reliable, the company may end up shipping too many defective chips. Both of these consequences causes a large loss in potential profit.

The testing of modern designs is becoming more difficult for test engineers. This is especially the case with SoC testing, where the engineer has very limited access to the entire chip. In order to make testing more manageable, test engineers must have a method that would allow them high controllability and observability over the chip. Controllability allows the engineer to place the circuit under test (CUT) into any configuration and apply any stimuli necessary during testing. Observability allows the engineer to see the state of the circuit at any point during testing [3]. In order to achieve high controllability and observability,

For information on obtaining reprints of this article, please send e-mail to: tdsc@computer.org, and reference IEEECS Log Number TDSC-0112-0805. Digital Object Identifier no. 10.1109/TDSC.2007.70215. testing is taken into consideration during the design phase of development. Design-for-test (DFT) allows the test engineer access to the chip that would otherwise be unavailable. Scan test is one method of DFT that gives engineers the ability to control and observe the CUT, allowing them to achieve very high fault coverage in a fast and reliable manner.

1.1 Scan Test

Scan has been generally accepted as the standard method of testing chips due to the high fault coverage and low overhead. Including scan while designing the chip requires one additional pin to the primary I/O to serve as the test control pin (TC) [3]. Internally, there is little impact on the design since the standard flip-flops (FFs) are exchanged with scan flip-flops (SFFs), which are then linked to one another creating a scan chain. TC selects between functional and test mode operations. SFFs carry the additional overhead of a single two-to-one multiplexer when compared to the standard FF. An example of a scan chain is shown in Fig. 1. TC controls each multiplexer, choosing between the normal mode input of the FF or the output of the previous SFF in the chain. Due to the additional multiplexer, normal mode performance could potentially be hindered since the output of the combinational logic blocks are not directly connected to the input of the FFs.

The FF registers make up the I/O to the combinational logic blocks in the chip, so test engineers are able to manipulate the values that are input (controllability) and view the output (observability) of each block. This is performed by multiplexing one primary input pin and one primary output pin as the scan-in (SI) pin and scan-out (SO) pin, respectively. Using the SI pin while the TC is enabled, a test pattern is scanned into the scan chain as

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Fig. 1. An example of a scan chain created from SFFs.

dictated by the system clock [3]. When the entire pattern is scanned in, the TC is disabled, and the chip is run in normal mode for one cycle storing the responses back into the SFFs. TC is again enabled to scan out the response, while at the same time, scanning in a new test pattern to check for new faults previous patterns were not able to detect. Using this method of test, sequential logic essentially becomes combinational logic during test. Creating test patterns that achieve high fault coverage is a much easier task for combinational logic than it is for sequential logic, significantly speeding up the test pattern generation process [3].

1.2 Chip Security

Security has become a greater concern in the design and test of chips recently [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. This has become more apparent with the advent of cryptochips [9]. Cryptochips perform encryption and decryption algorithms at the circuit level. Many researchers have been able to show that these chips are highly vulnerable to side-channel attacks using power analysis [10], timing analysis [11], and fault injection [12], [13]. These attacks are considered noninvasive, and if not considered carefully, strong encryption algorithms that would take years to crack by brute force can otherwise be crippled in a manner of weeks, days, or even hours without the need to disassemble the chip packaging.

Recently, a new vulnerability has been shown to compromise on-chip data. Scan test has been proven a security risk to the intellectual property (IP) on the chip and has become quite a concern to the design and test communities [14], [15], [16], [17]. Yang et al. [14] were able to simulate an attack on the scan chain of a DES cryptochip to reveal the secret key with using only three plaintexts. Although the scan chains have only been exploited to find the secret key of a cryptochip, it is just as easy to uncover proprietary IP through scan chains since vital registers are part of the chains that are allowing high controllability and observability. Instead of simply revealing fabrication defects, the scan chains are also revealing protected IP.

Currently, the main objective in testing has been to control and observe a chip as much as possible in order to achieve high fault coverage and diagnosis on the CUT. As useful as these properties are for testing, they are completely contradictory to the objectives of security on a chip. In order to protect a chip from malicious users, a chip must reveal as little as possible while still considered useful to the end user, but for reliability, a test engineer needs as much access to the chip as possible.

1.3 Contribution and Paper Organization

In order to prevent IP theft, security measures must be implemented during the design phase. However, similar to design countermeasures of the more conventional sidechannel attacks, a design countermeasure from scan-based attacks would prove futile against an invasive attack.

In this paper, we propose the Lock & Key security technique in order to prevent aggressive users from maliciously attacking the scan chains to reveal vital information about the chip using noninvasive methods [18] and extend the work to include the effect on DFT industrial flows and test applications techniques. Our relatively low overhead security solution against scan-based side-channel attacks minimizes the controllability and observability of the scan chain when an unauthorized user attempts to access them. The Lock & Key technique divides the scan chain into smaller subchains of equal length. The test security controller (TSC) used by this technique switches between secure and insecure mode for authorized and unauthorized users, respectively. When in secure mode, subchain operation is predictable but nonsequential, but when insecure, subchain operation is entirely random. This prevents malicious users from predicting where in the scan chain the stimuli on SI goes and where the response on SO comes from. The reduced predictability and random access eliminates repeatability and prevents reverse engineering.

This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we will discuss testability and security as it applies to modern designs and how the two apply to modern day hackers. Section 3 will discuss prior work performed in the field of chip test and security. We will then propose and discuss our method of Lock & Key security in Section 4. Section 5 presents an analysis of our method. Finally, we will wrap up our discussion in Section 6 with the conclusion.

2 OVERVIEW: TESTABILITY, SECURITY, AND HACKING

Testability and security inherently contradict each other. The testability of a chip can be defined by the amount of controllability and observability the test engineer is granted. The higher degree of controllability and observability allowed, the easier it is to test the CUT. The test is not only easier to perform, but the result of the test becomes more reliable due to a higher fault coverage.

Security ensures that anything in a circuit is safely stored within itself. The most common manner of providing security is to hide the information behind some form of recognition that would be able to tell a valid user from an attacker. Modern day security in all realms use this method to protect vital belongings, whether it is a security code for a home, retinal scanner for a lab, or encryption key for information. Security relies on making information obscure and difficult to figure out.

When trying to relate testability and security together in chip design, security is clearly contradicted by testability. By designing for testability, a designer is essentially revealing all information about the chip through the use of scan test. If the aim of designing a chip is security, it is very difficult to justify the amount of controllability and observability that testability aims to provide because of these leaks. It is also necessary, however, to ensure that the chip will function properly through testing in a fast and reliable manner. The only system secure from any leaks is one without any controllable inputs nor observable outputs, but this is absurd from both a testability and usability standpoint.

Much of this concern over chip security would not be necessary unless the IP is needed to be protected from malicious users and hackers. There are many hackers in the world with many different motivations. They range from the noble, attempting to make their fellow developers aware of their pitfalls, the malicious, stealing information that does not rightfully belong to them, and simply the curious [19]. No matter what their intent is, they are intruders to the system, and their access should be limited.

The skill set of hackers vary as much as their intentions. We have categorized hackers into the following classes:

- 1. The *Beginner* is as the name suggests. This class is just getting started, possibly out of curiosity. In general, beginners rarely put much effort into hacking and unless they have access to an item that describes step by step how to perform the attack, they are rarely a security risk.
- 2. The *Independent* class is more serious about performing attacks. The amount of knowledge they personally have may not be extraordinary, but they know where to find out what they need. Independent hackers are willing to put time, effort, and money into their endeavor and may often be underestimated by those implementing security measures. However, if the costs severely outweigh the gains, they may decide it is not worth the effort.
- 3. The *Business* class hackers are essentially performing business espionage. They are trying to get a step ahead of their competition even if it is an unethical behavior. Similar to the independent class, if the costs outweigh the gains, a business may decide to throw away the project.
- 4. Government hackers for the most part participate in these actions out of the security of their nation. National security is of the utmost importance to governments within recent years and anything considered a risk must be exploited.

The different classes of hackers tend to correlate with the amount of effort they are willing to put into a job and the amount of effort that is necessary to secure the device under attack. If the hacker is only a beginner, it can be assumed that unless the attack is available online or in a book, the hacker will give up with little effort. The chip designer then has little to worry about when designing a circuit. A simple encoding scheme may suffice. The next level of the hacker hierarchy may require much more effort to deter the hacker. A strong encryption algorithm must be used. Protecting an IP from the business hacker is very difficult since most businesses have an enormous amount of money and knowledge available but do not have much time since they must compete with other businesses. If a protection scheme proves to take too long to hack, it is possible a business may simply give up. It is next to impossible to secure a system against government hacking due to the almost unlimited resources at their disposal. It can be seen that the amount of overhead is quite different when trying to protect a chip from the many hacker classes. With each step up, the hierarchy, the cost, and the amount of overhead continues to increase just to obscure potential leaks in the system.

We focus our efforts on securing the scan chains from attacks such as methods described in [14]. This is not an easy task since the testability of a CUT is dependent on the amount of controllability and observability allowed through the scan chains. It is quite likely that hackers have a fair amount of knowledge of the chip they are attacking. It is not difficult to learn the pinouts and high-level timing of the circuit under attack since these are often provided in the specifications from the chip manufacturer [14]. With this information, a hacker is able to exploit the ability to run a chip in both functional and test modes.

Since a hacker has knowledge on the chip timing, a hacker also has enough knowledge of the chip to know when data is being stored in a particular register. By exploiting the ability to switch between functional and test modes, the hacker can perform two types of attacks based on the scan design properties of controllability and observability. The first method of attack begins with the application of a known value to the primary input of the chip while in functional mode. The hacker allows functional mode operation to continue until sensitive data is loaded into registers accessible through the scan chain, at which point, test mode is enabled. The test mode stops normal operation of the chip and creates a snapshot of the current state of the chip, which can be serially scanned-out with the help of the scan chain. By repeating this process and analyzing each response scanned-out, a hacker can target the location of a register in the scan chain and use this to reverse engineer the technology used in the design or a vital key in a cryptochip. This process is summarized in Fig. 2a. Since this attack is based on the ability of the hacker to observe chip operation and behavior using the scan chain, we will refer to this as a scan-based observability attack.

The second method of attack is based on both controllability and observability properties of scan-based designs. The scan chain provides an easily accessible entry-point for a fault-injection attack [12], [13]. The hacker begins this attack with the chip in test mode in order to apply a random pattern into the scan chain. By applying random patterns, random faults are exposed potentially bypassing security measures and changing necessary registers. Through the analysis of functional mode when faults are introduced and when no faults are present, the hacker is able to deduce various properties about the chip, as was done in [13], to find the secret key of a cryptochip. A summary of this attack



Fig. 2. Summary of the steps necessary to perform a successful scan-based attack. (a) Scan-based observability attack. (b) Scan-based controllability/observability attack.

is shown in Fig. 2b. This method of attack is based on controllability and observability provided by testing, and we will refer to this as a scan-based controllability/ observability attack.

Testability and security have what appears to be a mutually exclusive relationship. It is very difficult to satisfactorily meet the needs of both specifications. A middle ground must be met between the fully controllable and observable CUT and a black box. If one takes into consideration the hacker, a clearer relationship between testability and security can more easily be concluded. If the designer can target specifically which class he would like to prevent access to, it may be easier to make design compromises between testability and security. For example, knowing that the designer would like to prevent their IP from being accessed by an independent hacker, assuming they do not have a high-powered electron microscope at their disposal, the designer can make use of built-in self-test (BIST) on vital sections of the circuit while still using a conventional scan test for the remainder of the design. This method will still retain a high coverage for the scan tested areas but suffer slightly in the BIST tested sections [3]. The designer sacrificed testability for security but was able to target the design of the chip by qualitatively defining the importance of testability and security.

3 PRIOR WORK

Implementing encryption algorithms in hardware have revealed quite a few methods to discover the secret keys through side-channels. These side-channel attacks include differential power analysis [10], timing analysis [11], faultinjection [12], [13] and, most recently, scan chain hijacking, as demonstrated in [14]. It is also possible to reveal proprietary information through these side-channel attacks making these a particularly large concern to companies.

Due to the side-channel attacks, a lot of attention has begun to be paid toward the inclusion of security during design. Anderson and Kuhn [4], Ravi et al. [6] and Kocher et al. [7] discuss the importance of using tamper resistant design to prevent such side-channel attacks. A VLSI design flow was proposed in [8], which included designing tamper resistant circuits beginning as early as the RTL stage.

Traditional side-channel leaks have often been secured with the use of additional circuitry. Power analysis attacks can be prevented with noise inducing circuitry [10] or applying additional circuitry to hide supply variations [20]. Timing attacks can be prevented by adding additional gates, so all operations are performed in the same amount of time or to add random delays to the processing time [11]. Finally, fault-injection attacks can be detected with additional logic that performs the inverse operation of the original logic to check if the result reproduces the input [21], [22].

There has not been much work done that is directly related to the security of scan chains. A traditional method, which has become popular in smart card security, has been to blow polysilicon fuses that interrupt interconnects to the test ports or directly in the scan paths. However, it has been shown that the fuses can be reconnected with minimally invasive techniques [23]. There is also the option to completely cut off the test interface with a wafer saw [24]. Either option eliminates any possibility for in-field testing. Most have gotten around the concern by using BIST. In [9], Hafner et al. used BIST to test the entire cryptochip they designed. It provided high fault coverage for both the standard cells and memories but did not do fair nearly as well on the custom designed portions of the chip. Both BIST and boundary scan were used in [25]. The fault coverage



Fig. 3. Architecture of Lock & Key security measure.

still was not nearly as high as what could have been achieved with automatic test pattern generation (ATPG) for scan-based design. Any security sensitive I/O were excluded from the boundary scan, and it was not specified how such I/O were tested.

Recently, work has begun to secure scan designs without completely destroying access to the test interface. An encoding/decoding security scheme has been presented as a potential solution in [16] and [17]. More developed solutions have been published in [15], [26], and [27]. Hély et al. [15] present a method to prevent invasive and semiinvasive attacks by modifying the scan chains to internally scramble the values if the test mode was not properly secured. In order to do so, Hély proposed splitting up the scan chain into segments that connect to some other segments in the scan chain. By using a random number generator, the segments would internally scramble the contents of the scan chain making the output difficult to decipher. However, since scan segments are connected together, as the subchain length decreases, this technique will create significant logic and routing overhead. Yang et al. [26] proposed a method that only prevents access to sensitive registers during test mode. With the use of a mirror key register (MKR), they were able to remove the encryption key of an AES hardware implementation from the scan chain while the chip was set to insecure mode. Although this method works effectively to hide the secret key, it only provides security for special registers and not for the entire scan design. This method also requires a modification to the JTAG Standard [28] in order to be effective. Finally, in [27], the authors present a scan chain content control scheme. The content of the scan chain is translated into a signature that will be compared to a "golden signature." When the two signatures match, the scan chain functions properly, but if the signatures do not match, a system wide reset occurs, erasing all dynamic memory elements in the chip.

4 LOCK & KEY TECHNIQUE

The Lock & Key security technique can be used to secure both single and multiple-scan designs. For either case, the scan chain can be divided into smaller subchains of equal length. Test vectors are not sequentially shifted into each subchain but rather a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) performs a pseudorandom selection of a subchain to be filled. Fig. 3 shows a general architecture for the Lock & Key method for a single-scan design. This technique proposes a compromise between testability and security since the LFSR during insecure mode will protect the scan chain but also requires a nonsequential scan chain access when the user has also been verified.

This method prevents correct scan chain manipulation without the presence of a valid test key. This is ensured by the TSC, which consists of four main components: a finite state machine (FSM), test key comparator, LFSR, and decoder. There are two states the TSC can be in, namely, *secure* and *insecure* modes. The secure mode signifies that a trusted user is accessing the scan chain, so the TSC will select subchains in a predictable nonsequential order. The insecure mode signifies a state where the user attempting to access the scan chain is considered untrustworthy until deemed otherwise with a correct test key. Unless the test key is entered and confirmed to be correct, the TSC will unpredictably select subchains using the LFSR to SI and SO, presenting the user with false information about the scan chain.

A test engineer must perform two steps before entering a test vector into the scan chain for the first time. After enabling TC for the first time after a system reset occurs, the TSC controls all function of the subchains until an authorized or unauthorized party is detected. A test key must be the first pattern fed into the TSC. During the first k cycles after TC has been enabled, the first k-bits applied to the SI will be serially passed to the test key comparator and checked. After the k cycles, the FSM will receive the result. If the key matches the test key stored in a small secure register, the secure signal will be raised, allowing the TSC to begin operation in a secure mode, which it will remain in until the CUT is reset. If the secure signal remains low, operation in the insecure mode will resume. If the test key passes and the TSC enters secure mode, the test engineer then has the ability to seed the LFSR with a known seed in order to predict the order how the LFSR will select the subchains. Otherwise, the LFSR will work with the unpredictable random seed created in the LFSR right after a system reset.



Fig. 4. TSC design scheme.

With the LFSR seeded, operation of the scan chain can begin. Using a decoder to interface between the LFSR and the subchains, the TSC uses a one-hot output method to enable one subchain at a time to read from SI. The output of the LFSR is also directly connected to the multiplexer selector bits to allow the data from the subchain to pass to SO. Assuming the length of each subchain is *l*-bits long, after l clock cycles, the LFSR will shift to a new value, and the decoder will disable the currently active subchain and select a new subchain to read from SI. After $n_{sff} = l \times m$ cycles, where m is the total number of subchains and n_{sff} is the total length of the scan chain, the full length of the scan chain has been initialized with the first test vector. TC can again be set to zero to place the CUT into normal mode for one cycle to allow the pattern to propagate and capture the response back into the scan chain. When the CUT has returned to test mode, a new test vector is scanned into the subchains while scanning out the response.

Since test key verification is a one time start-up check, a failed test key causes the TSC to remain in an insecure mode until the CUT is reset. This essentially locks the scan chain from being used correctly for the duration of the testing process. This locking mechanism is also fairly transparent to a hacker since without prior knowledge of the security scheme, the chip would appear to be working as it should while still giving the hacker false data.

4.1 Design of Lock & Key

The Lock & Key technique depends on the design of the TSC, which is composed of four components. The FSM controls the behavior and current mode of the TSC; the test key comparator is only used when TC is enabled for the first time, returning a secure or insecure result; the LFSR selects a single subchain during scan operation and controls the output multiplexer; and the decoder translates the output of the LFSR into a one-hot enable scheme. Fig. 4 shows the signals passed between each of the components of the TSC. Communication between each of the components is kept to a minimum to reduce routing and the overall size of the TSC.

The FSM consists of simple state logic and two counters. The state logic sends control logic to the test key comparator and LFSR. The FSM also determines, upon the response of the test key comparator, whether to seed the LFSR with a vector from SI or to use the random seed created in the LFSR by the system reset. The first counter is a $\log_2(q)$ counter used only for seeding the LFSR, where q is the length of the LFSR. The second counter is a $\log_2(l)$ counter used for clocking the LFSR after l cycles, shifting the contents of the LFSR to enable a new subchain.

The test key comparator is used once only after the system has been reset and put into test mode for the first time. In order to keep the comparator small and since the test key from SI is read serially, each bit is serially checked against the key being stored on chip in a secure register. As each bit is compared, an FF stores the running result, which will eventually be read by the FSM. After *k* cycles, the final result will be read by the FSM determining whether the TSC will run in a secure mode or continue in an insecure mode.

When designing the Lock & Key technique, the goal is to have the ability to ensure security of the scan chains while maintaining simplicity and design independence. To prevent the decoder from becoming too complex, an LFSR with a primitive polynomial configuration will allow the selection of $m = 2^q - 1$ subchains, where q is the size of the LFSR in secure mode. Using a primitive polynomial allows the selection of all subchains once and only once during a test round. If a nonprimitive polynomial configuration is used, unless additional logic is included, some subchains may be selected more than once or never selected at all. Using the q bits from the LFSR, the decoder enables one of m outputs leaving the others at zero. Since there is at least one primitive polynomial for all values of q, the LFSR is guaranteed to choose each subchain once before repeating for any length of the LFSR [3].

The number of FFs in the design before scan insertion does not necessarily need to be evenly divisible by m. There are two possibilities to resolve this issue. The first is the inclusion of dummy FFs, which has become a common practice when dealing with delay testing [3] and can also be applied to this technique. The total number of FFs, n, and the total number of dummy FFs, n_{dFF} , needed is noted as follows:

$$n_{dFF} = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{when } (n \mod m) = 0 \\ m - (n \mod m), & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$
(1)

The second option would be to pad portions of the test pattern that are related to the shorter subchains. This would immediately shift out any dummy values at the



Fig. 5. Modifiable LFSR determined by security mode of TSC.

beginning of the pattern and would have no effect on the functional operation of the CUT. This option requires less design effort since it does not use additional logic but does add overhead to the test pattern. However, due to test compression techniques, the overhead would be minimal since the dummy values can be set to values that maximize compression.

The choice of a primitive polynomial significantly simplifies the design of the decoder. The decoder can directly translate the output of the LFSR into a run of zeros and single one to directly control each subchain. This method not only shortens design time but also reduces the area overhead of the TSC as a whole since additional logic is not needed to ensure all subchains are selected once during a test round.

The problem with using a primitive polynomial configured LFSR is the predictability of its behavior. If the LFSR were to remain unchanged for insecure mode operation, determining the order would not take long since the order is always the same, only the start and end points would differ. To avoid this predictability, the LFSR configuration must be altered when set to insecure mode. By modifying the LFSR to incorporate an additional *r*-bits for insecure mode operation, the primitive polynomial LFSR becomes a nonprimitive polynomial LFSR. As can be seen in Fig. 5, the additional bits are hidden behind a multiplexer and only become active for insecure mode operation. The interface between the LFSR and the decoder is not affected. Since the original LFSR only makes up a smaller part of the insecure mode LFSR, repetitively selecting the same subchain multiple times during one test cycle becomes possible, which results in a more complex output. A shorter periodicity is not a concern as it was in secure mode since all subchains do not need to be accessed, but the facade of a fully functional scan chain still exists.

Algorithms such as the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [29] also raises security and complexity concerns of using an LFSR. The algorithm requires knowledge of the output bitstream from the LFSR. However, both the specific values of the bitstream (LFSR polynomial) and length of the LFSR are not directly accessible through I/O pins and contribute to the complexity as addressed in Section 5. If LFSR linearity is still a security concern, due to the modular nature of the TSC, the LFSR could be replaced with a nonlinear solution at the cost of additional overhead.

4.2 Modification to Scan Subchains

In order for the Lock & Key technique to be effective, an enable signal must be used for each subchain. We cannot treat the enable signal as TC since that would place one subchain into test mode while the remaining subchains are in normal mode, potentially changing all registers that have already been loaded with a new test vector. We introduce two potential solutions that avoid modification of the standard scan cell.

The *Clock Gating* method has been proposed for lowpower testing in the past [30], [31]. We would like to apply the same principle to halt normal operation of the subchains when the enable signal from the TSC is low. In order to do so, this method adds an additional gate that combines the system clock and the enable signals from the TSC to the subchain clock. When the enable signal is high for a particular subchain, the subchain will behave as a normal scan chain with respect to the system clock. When the enable signal is low, the subchain will ignore the system clock and not shift when TC is high. Fig. 6a shows a gating technique that uses the system clock and the TSC enable signal. By adding the AND gate, as shown in Fig. 6a, when the respective EN signal for the subchain is low, the clock signal for each of the SFFs in the subchain will continue to



Fig. 6. Subchain modification techniques necessary to allow Lock & Key control. (a) Clock gating modification. (b) Subchain feedback modification.



Fig. 7. Application of Lock & Key to a multiple-scan chain design.

see a steady-state low and will not register new values into the FFs.

Since this is a small addition, the chip area is not severely impacted. It does however affect clock skew and chip performance. This solution is not suited for high performance applications, but does provide the opportunity for low-power testing since at most l scan cells would be in transition at any time as opposed to the full length of the scan chain $(m \times l)$.

Subchain Feedback is the second technique that can be used to avoid simultaneous normal and test mode subchain operation. Fig. 6b shows an example of the subchain feedback loop. Unlike clock gating, each subchain still shifts the SFF registers regardless of whether enable is high. By adding a multiplexer to the input of the subchain, the next value to be scanned in can either be from the new test vector if enable is high or from the last register of the subchain when enable is low. Since we assume that the length of each subchain is the same in the Lock & Key technique, the data in each subchain will be maintained after all other subchains have been scanned.

This option eliminates the performance problem created by clock gating but does not reduce the potential maximum number of transitions when shifting. Since all subchains are shifting regardless of the enable signal, there will still be as many transitions as if one continuous chain were used. There is the need for additional routing for the feedback loop and the multiplexer, but these additions are still fairly minimal when compared to the scale of modern designs.

4.3 Multiple-Scan Chains Design

When applying our Lock & Key technique to multiple-scan chain designs, essentially the same principles as single scan designs can be upheld. Multiple-scan chain design provides an additional layer of security since a decoder and signature analyzer are used at the input and output of the scan chain, respectively. This additional layers of hardware increases the complexity of interpreting the output for those not familiar with VLSI testing. Including the Lock & Key technique enhances the security already provided by the decoder and signature analyzer to further alter the output from being easily interpreted by those without an appropriate background. If the length of each scan chain is long enough, each scan chain can be broken into *m* subchains and the Lock & Key technique can be applied, as shown in Fig. 7. Since each scan chain in multiple-scan designs would normally be controlled by the same TC, multiple-scan designs can still be controlled by a single TSC. No additional side-channel information is leaked by using the same TSC as opposed to using individual TSCs for each scan chain in the design. By only using one TSC, differences between single- and multiple-scan designs on the Lock & Key technique are minimal.

When applying Lock & Key to multiple-scan designs with very short scan chains, two options are possible. The first option is to apply the technique as normal and break up each scan chain into m subchains no matter the length of each subchain. Although easy to implement, it may be difficult to split each scan chain into enough subchains that would maintain the complexity of the Lock & Key technique. The second option implements the Lock & Key technique on a different portion of the multiple-scan design. Rather than affecting the scan chains, the enable signals from the TSC are used to affect the configuration of the signature register. The signature mask would unpredictably change while in insecure mode but still follow a predictable manner when in secure mode. Implementing Lock & Key in this way would not affect the design of the TSC in a significant manner and rather than the response from the scan chains being more difficult to interpret, the signature register becomes less predictable.

4.4 In-Field Testing

Being able to test mission critical devices in the field has become very difficult with the high level of integration in modern designs. The IEEE 1149.1 JTAG Standard [28] allows not only manufacturing testing of these designs but also infield testing. The Lock & Key technique adapts well to infield testing practices and the IEEE 1149.1 JTAG Standard. Since our technique requires an authorization step before proper use of the scan chain(s) in the design, unauthorized users would not be able to access any vital information easily and authorized users can perform any needed maintenance, diagnosis, or debugging of the chip with conventional methods. Designs with Lock & Key only require the same modifications needed of a scan test when applying it to JTAG. A design with Lock & Key have no additional pins and no fewer pins than a design implemented with standard scan test, allowing an easy transition from a standard scan to the more secure Lock & Key scan test.

The only significant difference between using Lock & Key for in-field test as opposed to standard scan test is the scan chain setup process. A standard scan immediately allows the use of the scan chains in the CUT after test initialization. When using the Lock & Key technique, after initialization, the CUT must undergo an authorization process to ensure that a proper user is attempting to test the CUT. If the test key is authorized, then a test seed must be inserted. Only after these two steps can the test vector be inserted, as it would with the standard scan test.

Design overhead for in-field testing using the Lock & Key technique is no more than that of standard scan techniques. Also, the additional overhead created by appending a test key and test seed to the beginning of the test pattern is minimal when compared to the cumulative size of the test pattern.

4.5 Industrial DFT Flows

The Lock & Key technique requires little change to current DFT insertion flows. Since the design of the subchains is similar to multiple-scan design, it is possible to follow the same flow. Due to the modularity of the TSC, it can be designed separately and added as another module after scan insertion and layout optimization on the targeted design has been performed. Overall, the effect of Lock & Key on the design aspect is fairly minimal.

When concerned about generating test patterns, the correct scan order must be defined based on the LFSR polynomial and the initial seed. This information can be defined in the test protocol file, which is needed by the ATPG tool for scan chain information. From the perspective of the ATPG tool, it is a single scan chain since the order can be arbitrarily assigned based on a number of design factors. Therefore, industrial ATPG tools like TetraMax [32] are unaffected by this change.

Although the ATPG tool is not affected by Lock & Key, not all pattern application techniques are unaffected. Since there are different methods of performing delay fault testing such as launch-off shift (LOS) [33], launch-off capture (LOC) [34], and enhanced scan [35], we acknowledge that Lock & Key does not successfully work with LOS. However, this is not a major concern since the more widely practiced method of delay test in the industry, LOC, can be successfully applied to our technique. With that in mind, Lock & Key can be considered the same as applying scan to a design. All of the same signals as scan design are used without any change to their function.

5 ANALYSIS OF LOCK & KEY

Overall, the Lock & Key technique significantly increases the amount of work necessary to mount an attack on the scan chains. A hacker must perform the following tasks to successfully complete the attack and steal the chip IP:

1. Hackers must first learn of what security strategy is being used.

TABLE 1 Lock & Key against Hacker Classes

	Complexity			
	Low	Med	High	
Beginner	X	X	Х	
Independent		X	Х	
Business			Х	
Government				

- 2. If they figure out the strategy used, then they must find the secret test key for the operation of the chains to be predictable. The complexity of the key is completely dependent on the length, so with a sufficiently long key, stumbling across the correct key out of 2^k possibilities becomes quite unlikely.
- 3. Even if hackers were to be able to discover the test key, hackers must also determine the pseudorandom order that patterns will be scanned in and out by determining the configuration of the LFSR. The number of configurations the LFSR can potentially be placed in for secure mode is 2^q and for an insecure mode is 2^{q+r} .
- In cases where multiple-scan designs are used, hackers must also account for the additional layers of security provided by the decoder and signature register.
- 5. If hackers are able to find all this information, an attack can finally be mounted against the CUT while still having to manage with the pseudorandom selection of the subchains.

5.1 Complexity Analysis

The number of subchains needed completely depends upon the amount of complexity required to deter hackers. If there are m subchains in the design, the response scanned out on SO can be one of m! possible combinations when in secure mode or at most one of m^m combinations when in insecure mode. With as few as 15 subchains, an untrusted user that does not have knowledge of the LFSR configuration nor the seed would have more than one trillion unique combinations to choose from in a secure mode and more than 15^{15} possible combinations to choose from in an insecure mode. A brute force attempt at resolving the pattern to the location in the chain becomes extremely difficult and continues to increase in difficulty as m increases.

As discussed in Section 2, it is easier to design a chip when a specific hacker class is targeted. The benefit of Lock & Key security is that it scales easily to the amount of security the designer would like to include. A small TSC with a 4-bit LFSR would be more than suitable to stop a beginner but increasing the LFSR to 8-bits would potentially be sufficient to prevent some independent hackers from intrusion. As the granularity of each subchain becomes smaller and the number of bits in the LFSR becomes greater, the amount of security and number of subchain permutations become greater. Table 1 shows how well we expect the Lock & Key technique to hold up against a scan-based attack from the four hacker classes we presented in Section 2. Any minimal implementation should be able to stop a beginner due to their lack of knowledge. As the

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Number of	Size of	Size of Test	Size of LFSR	Size of	Total Size	% Overhead	% Overhead
LFSR Bits (q)	FSM	Key Comparator	(q+r)	Decoder	of TSC	s38417	s38584
4-bit LFSR	113	54	48	25	327	2.9	3.8
8-bit LFSR	133	54	71	307	652	5.7	7.5
12-bit LFSR	153	54	91	5432	5817	50.8	66.8

TABLE 2 Number of Gates in TSC for 4-Bit, 8-Bit, and 12-Bit

hacker's knowledge increases, the amount of complexity must also increase; however, no matter the complexity, government hackers can only be slowed down and never completely stopped.

5.2 Timing Overhead

Considering the size of test patterns for modern designs, the additional time inserting a test key and test seed do not prolong test time by an exorbitant amount. Only the initial setup placing the TSC into secure mode affects test time. After the test mode has been properly secured and setup, testing the CUT is no different from a standard scan test. The total test time (T) would take

$$T = [(m \times l + 1) \cdot n_{comb}] + (m \times l) + k + q, \qquad (2)$$

where *m* is the number of subchains, *l* is the length of each subchain, n_{comb} is the number of combinational vectors, *k* is the size of the test key, and *q* is the size of the LFSR. The significance of *k* and *q* decreases as $m \times l$ and the number of test rounds increase. With insignificant *k* and *q* values, the test time becomes solely dependent upon $m \times l$ and n_{comb} . Since $m \times l$ is the total length of the scan chain, we can replace it with n_{sff} , simplifying the equation further, making the total test time no different for the Lock & Key technique from a traditional scan test.

$$T \approx (m \times l + 1) \cdot n_{comb} + (m \times l), \tag{3}$$

$$T \approx (n_{sff} + 1) \cdot n_{comb} + n_{sff},\tag{4}$$

5.3 Area Overhead

We synthesized our Lock & Key technique in Verilog using Synopsys' Design Analyzer Tool [32]. Table 2 shows the number of equivalent gates returned by the Design Analyzer for the FSM, test key comparator, primitive polynomial configured LFSR, and decoder with 4-bit, 8-bit, and 12-bit LFSRs. The total size of the Lock & Key method along with overhead percentages for the International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS '89) benchmarks s38417 and s38584. The Lock & Key TSC grows fairly slowly for a large increase in the number of subchains. The FSM and test key comparator remain a fairly constant size. FSM operation is mostly independent of the size of the LFSR. The test key comparator is only dependent upon the size of the test key. For a minimally secure test key length, a length of $k \ge 40$ -bits should be used. For our implementation, we used a 64-bit test key. The size of the test key comparator in Table 2 does not include the additional overhead for on-chip key storage, but we did include it in the final size of the TSC. Only the growth of the LFSR and

decoder significantly affect the size, but the number of subchains that can be used exponentially increases with each additional bit. The total size of each LFSR includes the r-bits used for insecure mode operation. We chose to use a constant r value of 4 for all implementations and the primitive polynomials used were from that in [3]. A fair comparison to other works [15], [26], [27] cannot be made due to the authors not providing overhead information of their techniques or performing their analysis different benchmark designs.

A 4-bit LFSR can control 15 subchains placing any one of 15¹⁵ different subchain combinations on SO while insecure. Without prior knowledge, a beginner would have a little chance of hacking any vital information from the chip using the scan chain alone. By doubling the size of the LFSR to 8-bits, most independent hackers and small businesses should be deterred with the exponential increase in the number of subchains and security. Increasing the LFSR size again will greatly increase the amount of security but at the cost of a much larger area overhead due to the exponential growth of the decoder. Increasing the size beyond 10-bits risks producing a fairly large overhead for a level of security that an 8-bit LFSR may adequately provide.

Regardless of the size of the LFSR, if business or government hackers have enough resources to open the package and reverse engineer the layout, any effort to secure the scan chain is inadequate, which is common for any individual side-channel countermeasure. However, we suggest that design engineers use multiple design security techniques to force both business and government hackers to spend more time, money, and other resources to eventually make the costs outweigh any gains.

The components for the TSC are fairly standard and testing it with BIST can provide a fairly high coverage. Using a scan-based testing would result in the side-channel exposure that the Lock & Key technique tries to protect since it could be used to expose either the test key or random seed. The other option would be to simply not test the TSC logic at all since it is part of the testing logic for the CUT. This option is similar in nature to the choice of ignoring to test BIST logic due to the fact that if the CUT returns an incorrect result, the chip is faulty regardless of whether the CUT is faulty or the TSC is faulty [3].

6 CONCLUSION

Scan-based designs have been proven to be a significant security risk to the contents of a chip. Without proper security in place, encryption algorithms can be weakened, and IP can be stolen. We have proposed the Lock & Key technique as a countermeasure to the method that has been used to expose vital information through the scan chain. Unless the user is trusted, our technique will cause the scan chain to operate unpredictably and make exploitation very difficult. Design of the technique is flexible and straight forward to implement for varying degrees of security. Until another method of testing a chip can yield a similar coverage as scan-based designs with better security, flexible low-overhead solutions must be included in the design of the scan.

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