Fault Injection Attacks

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What is Fault Injection?

Fault injection attacks intentionally

cause errors in a system in order to

compromise the security of the system

Organization of Presentation

- Taxonomy of Attacks, Threats, and Security
- Non-Invasive Attacks
- Semi-Invasive Attacks
- Invasive Attacks
- Countermeasures
- Practical Fault Injection Attacks

Taxonomy of Attack Classes

Non-Invasive Attack

- Lowest cost
- No knowledge of inner workings of target
- No physical tampering

Semi-Invasive Attack

- Intermediate cost
- Some knowledge of inner workings of target
- Minimal physical tampering required

Invasive Attack

- High cost
- Full picture of inner workings of target
- Best chance of compromising target

Classification of Threats

Skilled Outsider

- Exploit existing weaknesses
- Minimal equipment sophistication
- Black-box understanding of target system

Knowledgeable Insider

- Advanced education and technical expertise
- Moderate equipment sophistication
- Some functional knowledge of target system

Funded Organization

- Highest education and technical expertise available
- High equipment sophistication
- High-Complete functional knowledge of target

Levels of Security

Level 1

- Bare minimum required protection
- Minimal defense against glitching and tampering

Level 2

- Some tamper proofing
- Some defense against glitch attacks

Level 3

- Passive system lock-outs
- Passive tamper proofing

Level 4

- Active system lock-outs
- Active tamper detection

Cost of Breaking Protection

- **None**: \$N/A Open book to attacker
- Low: \$1,000 Security through Obscurity
- Med-Low: \$3,000 Regular Microcontroller
- **Med**: \$30,000 Secure Microcontroller
- **Med-High**:\$150,000 ASIC, Secure FPGA, Smartcard
- High: \$1,000,000 Secure ASIC

Design for Security

Cost of a security breach

- Loss of customers and reputation
- Fines from government
- Loss of bottom line

Value of secured data to attacker

- Commercial value
- Strategic value
- Profitability

Cost of security implementations

- Price increase
- Area and complexity increase
- Power consumption increase

Overview of Non-Invasive Attacks

Black Box Attacks

- Brute Force Attack
- Software Attack
- Data Remanence

Side Channel Attacks

- Timing Attack
- Power Analysis Attack
- Used in conjunction with Fault Injection

Fault Injection Attacks

- Clock Glitching
- Voltage Glitching
- Used to speed up Black Box Attacks

Black Box Attacks

Brute Force

- Memory verify guessing
- Cryptographic key guessing
- Cyphertext-to-Plaintext Guessing

Software Exploits

- Undocumented functions
- Security function flaws
- Test interface flaws

Data Remanence

- Lower temperature to -20C or less
- Volatile memory retains data
- Read volatile memory contents

Side Channel Attacks

Timing Attack

- Number of cycles as a function of subroutine
- Number of cycles as a function of subroutine's outcome
- Number of cycles as a function of secret information
- Can be used to reverse engineer the system
- Can be used to reduce guesses for brute force

Power Analysis Attack

- Current consumption as a function of subroutine
- Current consumption as a function of subroutine's outcome
- Current consumption as a function of secret information
- Can be used to reverse engineer the system
- Can be used to reverse engineer data flow
- Can be used to reduce guesses for brute force

Side Channel Attack Setup



Fault Injection Attacks

Clock Glitching

- Burst of double clock speed timing critical
- Requires knowledge gained from side-channel attack
- Prevent flip-flops from latching correct data
- Prevent security fuses from setting properly
- Could cause skipping instructions

Voltage Glitching

- Burst of high or low voltage timing critical
- Requires knowledge gained from side-channel attack
- Force VDD < VTH</p>
- Prevent security fuses from setting properly
- Change control logic outputs
- Change memory amplifier outputs

Overview of Semi-Invasive Attacks

Backside Decapsulation

- Backside Imaging
- Laser Scanning
- Reverse Engineering

Fault Injection Attacks

- Local Heating
- Flash Glitching
- Laser Glitching

Backside Decapsulation



Source: http://freudlabs.com/sample_preparation

Backside Decapsulation

Backside Imaging

- Substrate penetrated by infrared light
- Transistor layout is visible through substrate
- Reverse engineering of block-level functionality

Laser Scanning

- Optical Beam Induced Current (Unpowered IC)
- Light-Induced Voltage Alteration (Powered IC)
- See memory structures and read stored values

Reverse Engineering

- Determine size of data bus
- Determine location of control logic
- Determine location of security logic

Backside Imaging





Source: Skorobogatov. Semi-Invasive Attacks. Page 94

Example of Laser Scan



Source: Skorobogatov. Semi-Invasive Attacks. Page 98

Fault Injection Attacks

Local Heating

- High power laser is used to selectively heat small areas
- Hot enough to change VTH but not hot enough to damage
- Trial and error with location is used to determine glitches

Flash Glitching

- Magnified camera flash can cause mass glitching
- Tinfoil masks created to cause selective glitching
- Trial and error with location and timing is used to determine glitches

Laser Glitching

- Infrared laser is used to selectively glitch small areas
- Trial and error with location and timing is used to determine glitches
- Process is more precise than Flash Glitching

Overview of Invasive Attacks

Reverse Engineering

- Decapsulation
- Layout Reconstruction
- Memory Extraction

IC Modification

- Laser Cutting
- Test Point Creation
- Wire Bonding

Micro Probing

- Eavesdropping
- Signal Injection
- Fault Injection

Decapsulated IC



Source:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Yamaha_YM3812_audio_IC_decapsulated.jpg

Reverse Engineering

Decapsulation

- Use of acids to remove layers one by one
- Provide physical access to all sections of IC
- Provide knowledge about design of IC

Layout Reconstruction

- Image each layer before removing it
- Build netlist from all images
- Reverse engineer all functions of IC

Memory Extraction

- Read contents of ROM with reconstruction
- Scan contents of SRAM
- Scan contents of EEPROM/FLASH

IC Modification

Laser Cutting

- Not completely destructive
- Selective exposure of lower layers
- Selectively disconnect nets

Test Point Creation

- Cut test points into IC
- More spots for micro probing below top layer
- See more signals on more nets

Wire Bonding

- Use laser cutting to expose net
- Cut test point for bonding target
- Modify circuit paths as needed



Source: Skorobogatov. Semi-Invasive Attacks. Page 85

Example of Laser Cutting





Source: Skorobogatov. Semi-Invasive Attacks. Page 88

Micro Probing

Eavesdropping

- Listen to control lines
- Listen to data bus
- Full bypass of all protections

Signal Injection

- Insert control signals
- Modify memory contents
- Forcefully bypass security controls

Fault Injection

- High voltage between two probes
- Destroy transistors
- Destroy traces

Sample Micro Probing Station



Source: Skorobogatov. Semi-Invasive Attacks. Page 84

Countermeasures

Overview of Exploits

- Brute Force Attacks
- Software Exploits
- Data Remanence
- Timing Attacks
- Power Analysis Attacks
- Clock Glitching
- Voltage Glitching
- Reverse Engineering
- IC Modification
- Micro Probing
- Memory Attacks
- Optical Glitching

Brute Force Attacks

- Do not return piecemeal Verify results
- Large number of possible combinations
- Encryption

Software Exploits

- Software Quality Assurance
- Design for security
- Stay one step ahead of attackers
- Exception handling
- No readbacks on memory
- Destroy programming interface after use

Data Remanence

- Erase all volatile memory on power-up
- Temperature sensor monitoring
- Erase all memory on out-of-spec temperature

Timing Attacks

- Make all outcomes of subroutine same number of cycles
- Insert noops where needed
- Randomize response times

Power Analysis Attacks

- Intentionally noisy power signal
- Make operations consume similar power
- Increase the signal-to-noise ratio

Clock Glitching

- Internal oscillator for bootloader code
- Internal oscillator for secure functions
- Make security fuses faster than control logic
- Asynchronous logic

Voltage Glitching

- Internal brownout reset
- Different voltage threshold for security fuses

Reverse Engineering

- Security through Obscurity
- Additional metal layers to cover design
- Re-mark or un-mark all ICs on PCB
- Glue logic
- Small transistor size
- Use of ASICs to replace glue logic on PCB

IC Modification

- Metal protection layers on top
- Critical signals routed on top of important targets
- Tamper sensors in metal layers

Micro Probing

- Tamper sensors in metal layers
- Small transistor size
- Internal shielding
- Top level shielding
- Security through obscurity
- Glue Logic

Memory Attacks

- UV Protection
- Temperature lockout sensors
- Tamper sensors to detect decapsulation
- Close proximity between security fuses and memory

Optical Glitching

- Protective metal layers to block optical penetration
- Tamper sensors in metal layers
- UV Protection
- IR Protection
- Proximity of security fuses and control logic to memory

Practical Fault Injection Attacks

Overiew of Attacks

Bumping: Extract contents of protected memory with Verify

- Step 1: Backside Decapsulation
- Step 2: Backside Imaging
- Step 3: Side Channel Attack
- Step 4: Laser Glitching Location
- Step 5: Laser Glitching Timing
- □ Step 6: Brute Force Attack

Attacks on Cryptographic Algorithms

- Attack RSA Repeated Squaring Retrieve Secret Key
- Bellcore Attack Find Prime Factor
- □ Sign Change Fault Elliptic Curve System Attack
- Directly attack cryptoprocessor

Step 1: Backside Decapsulation

- Use dremel tool to remove backside of outer casing
- Clean surface of exposed substrate material
- Install the IC upside-down to a test interface board



Source: Skorobogatov. Semi-Invasive Attacks. Page 75

Step 2: Backside Imaging

- Use 1000nm infrared light and an optical microscope
- Identify the location of the EEPROM/FLASH memory
- Identify the locations of the memory control logic
- Determine memory bus width



Source: Skorobogatov. Optical Fault Masking Attacks. Page 4

Step 3: Side Channel Attack

- Set up a power analysis attack using a 10ohm sense resistor
- Perform a Verify function on a dummy input
- Monitor transient current to reverse engineer the process
- Determine packet size of Verify function



Source: Skorobogatov. Flash Memory Bump Attacks. Page 7

Step 4: Laser Glitching Location

- Set Verify to a pattern of all '1' or all '0'
- Find a location in the memory control logic to attack
- Keep trying until your verify pattern succeeds



Source: Skorobogatov. Flash Memory Bump Attacks. Page 5

Step 5: Laser Glitching Timing

- Configure Laser timing to attack all but one block
- Verify that your timing delivers repeatable results
- Maximum unmasked length is the data bus width
- The fewer bits you can unmask at a time the better



Source: Skorobogatov. Flash Memory Bump Attacks. Page 12

Step 6: Brute Force Attack

- Perform a brute force attack on the first unmasked segment
- Unmask the next segment and repeat
- Repeat until all segments are determined
- Example: Verification of a 1024 bit memory on an 8-bit bus
- Traditional Brute Force = 2^1024 Combinations
- Bump Attack = 128*2^8 = 2^15 Combinations
- Example: Verification of a 16384 bit memory on a 16-bit bus
- Traditional Brute Force = 2^16384 Combinations
- Bump Attack = 1024*2^16 = 2^26 Combinations

To the Victor go the Spoils:

- Commercial IP theft
- Recovery of cryptographic keys
- Modify software to insert exploits
- See plaintext messages
- Use stolen keys to extract encrypted data

Questions

Questions?

Works Cited

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